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Making sense of the Resource-Based View? 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Resource Based View (RBV) of strategic management has been criticized for relying 
on inconsistent assumptions of rationality, and mutually inconsistent underlying 
hypotheses. In this paper, I outline how these critiques can be addressed by re-building 
RBV on a sense-making foundation. The core notions from sense-making of bounded 
cognition, retrospective sense-making, incrementalism, loose coupling, causal maps and 
organizational paradigm are introduced. These are then used to propose a re-construction 
of key RBV constructs, extending some conceptual discussions, and providing for a 
conceptually consistent formulation. Implications for the use of RBV as a theory and 
future research are discussed. 
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Introduction 
This paper reviews some of the criticisms and limitations of the Resource-Based View 
(RBV) and discusses how articulating RBV with sense-making helps toward constructing 
a more robust theory and addresses the weaknesses and criticisms identified. 
Over the past two-and-a-half decades, RBV has emerged as perhaps the most fruitful and 
controversial contemporary perspective in strategic management. It has fuelled the 
conversation within the field of strategy (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992) with numerous 
advances and arguments, and also some aporias.  
In terms of advances, RBV research has been credited with restoring the balance between 
internal and external analysis in strategic management theory (Collis, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989), RBV has been argued to provide the basis for a new theory of the firm 
(Conner, 1991), and it has been offered as a theory of competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991, Peteraf, 1993), a theory of rents (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), and a theory of value 
creation (Peteraf & Barney, 2003).  
Arguments about RBV included Porter’s (1991, 1996) critiques that the RBV did not 
address appropriately the question of explicating the processes by which advantage was 
created, and that activities were a more appropriate focus of analysis than resources. The 
theory of dynamic capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) 
has been introduced as an extension of RBV to incorporate a processual dimension and a 
better understanding of how advantage is gained and maintained over time. Although not 
presented as such, it constitutes a reply to Porter’s arguments against the static nature of 
RBV. Proponents of the RBV have also been criticized for poorly defining the core 
constructs of the theory (Foss & Knudsen, 2003) a critique that triggered Peteraf and 
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Barney’s (2003) refining of their assumptions and arguments, leading to a firmer and 
more precisely detailed formulation of RBV as a theory of value creation. RBV scholars 
have been criticized for failing to agree on the definition of key variables and constructs, 
leading to inconsistent presentations of theory (Bromiley, 2005; Priem & Butler, 2001). 
RBV has been criticized for resorting to unobservable variables, thus making empirical 
research and validation problematic (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). RBV has also been under 
attack for proposing tautological arguments because resources are defined in terms of 
their performance outcomes and thus not empirically testable (Priem et al., 2001), which 
drew a response from Barney (Barney, 2001b) describing how some of the RBV 
variables (value, rarity, imitability) could be operationalized and empirically tested. The 
emphasis on the creation of customer value (exogenous to the firm) in Peteraf & Barney 
(2003) was also advanced as an argument against the tautology claim.  
Finally, RBV has been analyzed as containing several aporias. The assumption of 
bounded rationality has been identified as inconsistently applied: on the one hand 
managers make boundedly rational decisions leading to resource heterogeneity, but at the 
same time RBV conceptualizes markets at equilibrium a situation where firms optimize, 
thus assuming substantive rationality (Bromiley, 2005). Similarly, the articulation of 
RBV with evolutionary approaches (Barney, 2001a: 646-647) leading RBV to embrace 
dynamic capabilities and routines (Montgomery, 1995) sits ill at ease with market 
equilibrium (Bromiley & Papenhausen, 2003; Lengnick-Hall & Wolff, 1999). These 
inconsistencies in the internal logic of RBV have prompted calls to incorporate more 
rigorous behavioral assumptions and greater precision in the articulation between 
concepts (Bromiley, 2005; Foss, 2003). Although some elements of articulation between 
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RBV and behavioral theory have been formulated (Amit et al., 1993; Johnson & Hoopes, 
2003), and between RBV and evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1991; Winter, 2003) 
much work remains to be done. 
In this paper, I argue that efforts to develop RBV into a more robust theory can be helped 
by building on insights from the sense-making perspective (Weick, 2001). Sense-making 
appears to be a strong candidate on three counts: it incorporates extensive behavioral 
constructs, it articulates individual and collective levels of cognition, and it is an 
evolutionary perspective compatible with mainstream evolutionary theories of the firm in 
economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982). In the first section of the paper, some of the core 
sense-making concepts pertinent to RBV are presented. In the second section, I discuss 
how these concepts can be used as a foundation for RBV arguments. 
 
Sense-making: key concepts 
The sense-making perspective conceives “organizations as collections of people trying to 
make sense of what is happening around them” (Weick, 2001: 5). This is apparently quite 
different from RBV where firms are seen as bundles of resources (Spanos & Lioukas, 
2001). One way in which to resolve this apparent contradiction could be to argue that 
people are possibly a firm’s most precious resource (Barney, 1986a; Winter, 1987). 
However, this argument is only partly satisfactory for it ignores the second half of 
Weick’s definition: people are not passive resources waiting to be utilized, they are 
actively trying to make sense of their surroundings. This adds two further notions to 
theorizing organizations in the sense-making perspective, First, sense-making introduces 
explicitly a social dimension to organizational behavior (“collections of people”). 
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Second, the intentionality of actors is highlighted as a key behavioral driver: people are 
not merely reactive to events and their actions can be self-directed. Intentionality and 
social interaction are key sense-making constructs that can be used to provide robust 
behavioral foundations to RBV: in the rest of this paper I will use sense-making as a 
starting point from which to (re)construct RBV arguments. In the remainder of this 
section, key sense-making concepts are presented, and foundations for establishing RBV 
arguments are laid. For the purposes of the present discussion, sense-making concepts 
and themes can be organized under two headings: bounded cognition, and social 
interaction. Each is examined in turn. 
 
Bounded cognition 
The sense-making perspective fully acknowledges the influence of Simon’s (1957) notion 
of bounded rationality, and the processual approach initiated by March & Simon (1958) 
and Cyert & March (1963) (Weick, 1979: 20-21). In this view, human beings think 
rationally, but boundedly so, due to perceptual and cognitive limitations. The substantive 
rationality of classical economics hypothesized that people could maximize decision-
making outcomes because they had perfect information, could anticipate precisely and 
reliably the consequences of action, and would systematically compare all alternatives 
using consistent criteria. Boundedly rational people have incomplete/imperfect 
information, fragmentary knowledge of consequences, and do not systematically compare 
all alternatives (Simon, 1957). The literature dealing with bounded rationality in 
evolutionary economics tends to explore and highlight the differences between the 
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substantive rationality posited in mainstream micro-economics theory and various forms 
of bounded rationality (Chaserand, 2003; Radner, 2000).  
The sense-making literature takes the thinking about bounded rationality in a different, 
but complementary direction. It acknowledges the ways in which bounded rationality 
differs from substantial rationality and goes on to explore the cognitive processes 
involved under bounded rationality. For this reason, the sense-making perspective can be 
said to pay more attention to “bounded cognition” (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Potts, 2001) than 
bounded rationality. Cognition is bounded by “brackets” or schemas (Weick, 1979: 153-
155): mental structures that select and accept information, and direct action. These mental 
structures are constructed over time through experience, which becomes instantiated in 
cause maps tacitly memorized, and schemas that drive individual perception and action 
are defined (Neisser, 1976). Similar phenomena can be observed at the collective level: 
the organizational paradigm consists of shared mental models, values and beliefs that 
explain the environment and how the organization can operate successfully (Johnson, 
1988; Weick, 1995). In this respect, individual and organizational actions are in a large 
part driven by the tacit knowledge incorporated in the cause maps (Baumard, 1999). 
Bounded cognition is an iterative process, schemas are re-built every time they are 
invoked, leading to incremental cognitive processes. Bounded cognition thus copes with 
the equivocality, richness, and complexity of the environment by selecting out 
information that is perceived to have low relevance, and by proceeding in small 
incremental steps. This increases the probability that action leads to unintended 
consequences (Perrow, 1984; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
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Because bounded cognition operates in incremental iterative processes where actors have 
limited forward visibility, it does not easily accommodate the linear unfolding of 
intentions. Rather, bounded cognition assumes that actors presume logic in action, even 
when this logic is not immediately perceptible. This is a core assumption underlying 
Weick’s definition of enactment as retrospective sense-making, captured by the phrase: 
“how can I know what I think until I see what I say?” (Weick, 1979: 133). The process of 
retrospective sense-making involves four stages linked by feedback loops (see Figure 1) 
and described as follows: 1) ecological change happens when a change in the flow of 
experience triggers the attention of the actor (“what”); 2) change is followed by 
enactment when actor(s) take(s) action to bracket the change and/or do(es) something 
which triggers the change (“I say”); 3) selection where schemas are invoked to make 
sense of the change (“I see what I say”); 4) retention where successfully enacted 
environments are memorized as new cause maps (“I know what I think”). The sense-
making cycle is activated until a sensible interpretation of the environment has been 
generated, which may involve a change in cause maps.  
 
= = = = = 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
= = = = = 
 
Bounded cognition and retrospective sense-making lead to constructed environments. 
When perceptions are filtered, and cognition is driven by tacit knowledge and schemas, 
actors equipped with different filters, knowledge and schemas may construct very 
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different interpretations of the same events (Allison, 1971). Further, because actors do not 
necessarily perceive every aspect of the environment and attribute cause-and-effect 
rationality ex-post, they can persist in systematic error: “when an actor attempts to 
determine what has occurred, his explanations may well be erroneous and he may persist 
in his nonadaptive responses” (Weick, 1979: 127). Bounded cognition and incremental 
processes lead to situations where optimization and maximization are highly improbable: 
because cognition is bounded it is difficult, and possibly impossible, to determine the 
optimum; incrementalism and limited visibility of the consequences of action make 
maximization equally elusive as actors engage in behaviors which have unintended 
consequences. The perspective of sense-making thus constructs a context where history 
matters: the way in which bounded cognition unfolds in the present is inextricably linked 
to and influenced by past experience, for good or ill. 
 
Social interaction 
Organizations as collections of people trigger attention as economic institutions but also 
as social constructs. First, the notion reminds us that organizations do not exist without 
people. Second, organizations come to life through the interactions between the actors 
that populate them: in other words, double interacts are the building blocks of organizing 
(Weick, 1979). A double interact occurs when an action by actor A elicits a specific 
response by actor B (interact) which in turns triggers a response from A (double interact). 
As organizational members can be in relation with multiple organizational actors by 
virtue of their roles and positions, organizations can be described as networks of 
interlocked behaviors. Following, organizations and structures are continuously created 
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and re-created through the activation of interlocked behaviors (Jarzabkowski, 2004). 
Conceiving of organizations as networks of interlocked behaviors highlights the potential 
fragility of organizations: as organizations are re-constructed on an ongoing basis, they 
require access to resources in order to maintain themselves (Weick, 1979; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  
Double interacts are initiated and repeated for multiple purposes. Double interacts are 
means to coordinate collective action and effect division of labor in organizations, a 
major benefit of collective action over individual efforts. Double interacts also lend 
reliability and predictability to organizational behavior when considered together with the 
schemas and cause maps of bounded cognition: through experience, A learns how B will 
respond, and vice-versa. With one limitation: because each time an interaction is initiated, 
it is re-created and therefore it becomes susceptible to change and variation (Feldman, 
2004).  
Double interacts provide a sense-making foundation to organizational routines, but in a 
way that differs from Nelson & Winter’s (1982) original conceptualization which relied 
more on tacit knowledge than bounded rationality (Foss, 2003). In a sense-making 
perspective, double interacts as foundations for routines rely as much on the tacit 
knowledge embedded in cause maps and schemas as it does on bounded cognition: 
routines are organizational devices to economize on cognitive efforts. Further, the sense-
making perspective acknowledges the inertia built in routines that lends them reliability 
and predictability, but at the same time also identifies the potential for variation and 
change that comes with the re-construction of interactions every time they are invoked by 
organizational actors (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Indeed, a sense-making view of 
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organizations highlights that change cannot be reduced to an isolated, programmed, and 
purposeful event, rather that it is a permanent state of organizations -though not 
necessarily exhibiting constant intensity (Weick & Quinn, 1999). 
Another characteristic of organizations highlighted by the network of double interacts 
perspective is that most organizations, and arguably all those that are resilient, are loosely 
coupled systems (Weick, 1976; Weick et al., 2001). Loosely coupled systems have the 
advantage of adaptability, flexibility, persistence over tightly coupled systems, and may 
be cheaper to run because they diminish the need for detailed coordination. Conversely, 
“loose coupling also carries connotations of impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness 
all of which are potentially crucial properties of the ‘glue’ that holds organizations 
together” (Weick, 1976: 3). Loose coupling is a reminder of the potential fragility of 
organizations mentioned earlier, and that the glue that holds organizations together 
appears to be those shared mental models and tacit knowledge that constitute 
organizational paradigms (Johnson, 1988; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Double interacts 
as ways of effecting division of labor play a crucial role in loosely coupled systems: 
double interacts allow for intention and action to reside in separate persons, sometimes 
even persons located in different organizational sub-systems, and geographical locations. 
This imposes nontrivial communication constraints between co-workers in order to effect 
well coordinated collective action. Intentions and actions can be decoupled when: 
intentions are equivocal, the consequences of action are unknown, the means by which 
intentions translate into action are unclear or conflictual, intentions are not known at the 
time of action, there are multiple and potentially conflicting intentions (Weick, 1976: 15). 
Thus, organizations as loosely coupled networks of double interacts are potentially rife 
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with unintended consequences and causal ambiguity. Which both have implications to 
inform RBV: unintended consequences resulting from loose coupling reduce the potential 
for optimization, and causal ambiguity plays a key role in firm heterogeneity and 
resource inimitability. 
Conceiving of organizations as loosely-coupled systems of interlocked behaviors 
highlights their potential for social complexity. However, firm boundaries are not 
necessarily clearly drawn (Weick, 1979) and interlocked behaviors extend beyond firm 
limits to encompass its supply chain partners, allies, and stakeholders in strategic 
networks (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). Thus a sense-making perspective is 
compatible with an institutional perspective, where organizations are embedded in 
networks of relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1997). The institutional perspective 
is of note here as organizational practices and policies are influenced by institutional 
norms of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) which do not necessarily lead to 
economic efficiency and optimization (Kogut, 2000).  
 
In this section, we have briefly reviewed key constructs from the sense-making 
perspective: bounded cognition, causal maps, schemas and tacit knowledge, 
incrementalism, retrospective sense-making, constructed environments, double interacts 
and routines, evolutionary change, loosely coupled systems, and social embeddedness. In 
the next section of this paper, I examine how these constructs can contribute to provide 
foundations for a re-formulation of the RBV that avoids logical inconsistencies and 
contradictions. 
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Toward a sense-making re-thinking of RBV 
The Resource-Based View is predicated on explaining performance differences between 
firms. The basic argument is that value creating resources and capabilities are 
heterogeneously distributed among firms, opening up the possibility of above average 
returns. The distribution of resources and capabilities can remain durably heterogeneous, 
due to failures in strategic factor markets, resource scarcity and uncertain imitability 
(Barney, 1986b; Barney, 1991). One of the key hypotheses of RBV is that the presence of 
strategic resources
1
 is sufficient to establish the potential for competitive advantage: there 
is a direct relationship between the resources and performance. As mentioned in the 
introduction, there is a logical contradiction in the RBV’s treatment of bounded 
rationality, hypothesized to justify heterogeneity, and the direct link between resource 
presence and performance which implies optimizing behavior. The proposition that firms 
can maintain sustained competitive advantage, central in RBV and even further in the 
dynamic capabilities/dynamic RBV extensions (Helfat et al., 2003; Teece & Pisano, 
1994), implies further logical inconsistencies: assuming that over the long run firms can 
identify ex-ante which capabilities will be valuable in the future is consistent with 
assumptions of substantive/calculative rationality (Radner, 2000) not bounded rationality, 
whilst the dynamic process of continuous change implied by the dynamic RBV sits ill at 
ease with assumptions of market equilibrium and optimization. 
In this section, I provide an outline of how RBV can be usefully re-constructed from a 
sense-making foundation. I begin with bounded cognition as the cause of competitive 
advantage and the relationships between enacted environments and firm heterogeneity, 
                                                 
1
: Strategic resources satisfy the VRIO criteria (Value, Rarity, Inimitability, Organization) as defined by 
Barney (1995). 
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then how loose coupling can generate causal ambiguity, how shared cause maps and 
organizational paradigms can be sources of competitive advantage and disadvantage, and 
conclude on how sense-making offers a fresh perspective on the influence of 
organizational structures in RBV. 
 
Bounded cognition, enacted environments, heterogeneity and competitive advantage 
Wernerfelt described as follows his dissatisfaction with strategy formulation based 
exclusively on external analysis, and thus his motivation for writing his seminal Strategic 
Management Journal paper (Wernerfelt, 1984): “if all MBAs learn to identify the ‘most 
attractive’ niche, who will get it and why will competition not destroy the 
attractiveness?” (Wernerfelt, 1995: 172). As mentioned before the RBV resolution of this 
problem is based on imperfect factor markets, uncertain imitation, and so on. A sense-
making perspective suggests a different answer: there may be no such thing as “the ‘most 
attractive’ niche”! Entrepreneurs have time and again demonstrated that it is possible to 
launch highly profitable ventures in industries long considered unattractive (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005). In other words: “if people imagine that the environment is separate 
from the organization and lies out there to be scanned so that effective responses can be 
produced, then they will spend their resources outfitting themselves with the equivalent 
of high-powered binoculars to improve acuity. If people recognize that they create many 
of their own environments, then all of that effort to improve acuity is irrelevant” (Weick, 
1979: 178-179). Bounded cognition and incrementalism lead managers to develop 
idiosyncratic perceptions of their environments, and to differentiate their firms in ways 
not expected by competitors who have not (could not have) enacted the same vision. 
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The enactment of created environments is an incremental process which involves 
resource commitments and experiential learning over time. As noted earlier, bounded 
cognition and incrementalism thus highlight how past actions constrain present and future 
firm behavior. In other words, sense-making provides cognitive underpinnings to path 
dependency, which has been identified as a source of firm heterogeneity among firms by 
RBV scholars (Dierickx et al., 1989). Further, these cognitive foundations to path 
dependency help explain how path dependency is also a source of causal ambiguity and 
uncertain imitability (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990) which sustain firm heterogeneity over 
time. The ex-post attribution of cause-and-effect relationships in sense-making leave 
room for misinterpretation and unintended consequences: “practitioners often conclude 
that effectiveness is the result of rational, orderly action. That conclusion is often an 
artifact of hindsight -we know what happened before we look back to discover why it 
happened. What we fail to see when we use hindsight are the experiments, false starts, 
and corrections that enabled people to learn and improve” (Weick, 2001: 38). 
Path dependency, durable firm heterogeneity, uncertain imitability and causal ambiguity 
are necessary conditions for performance differentials by firms. However, the sense-
making perspective reminds us that these are the outcomes of bounded cognition. 
Competitive advantages are not caused by market failures, it is because human beings are 
boundedly rational that managers make differentiated choices as to which course of 
action to follow, leading to durable heterogeneity in resource endowments for firms, and 
hence to some performing better than the rest. 
The sense-making perspective thus highlights how difficult it is to gain competitive 
advantage as managers cannot know with certainty ex-ante which resources or 
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capabilities will be useful in the future (another formulation is that the resources that can 
be identified are probably so obviously valuable that many firms will attempt to secure 
them and thus they may not be sources of performance differentials). Incrementalism and 
path dependency also highlight the bounds of organizational learning and adaptation: 
there is evidence that managerial cognition and cognitive biases influence the direction of 
search processes and learning (Levinthal & March, 1993; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). In 
other words, competence renewal processes cannot be expected to lead reliably and 
consistently on evolutionary paths that will sustain competitive advantage. Further, the 
decision to invest or not in capabilities renewal processes which are not themselves 
costless involves managerial trade-offs that are not the focus of discussion in mainstream 
dynamic capabilities research (Winter, 2000, 2003). The dynamic RBV thus appears to 
overlook the implications of bounded cognition and to underestimate the costs, trade-offs 
and difficulties involved in organizational adaptation and learning (Bromiley, 2005). 
In conclusion, bounded cognition at the same time creates the conditions of superior 
performance, and precludes the possibility of a ‘rules to riches’, but not for the market-
based reasons invoked by mainstream RBV scholars (Barney, 2001b). Rather, the 
invention of a ‘rule for riches’ implies the ability to identify valuable strategic resources 
ex-ante, in other words it assumes substantive rationality. 
 
Loose coupling and causal ambiguity 
Strategic management researchers have argued on numerous occasions that gaining 
competitive advantage and exploiting Ricardian rents depends on the ability of firms to 
create “isolating mechanisms” (Rumelt, 1984). RBV research suggests that such 
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mechanisms may arise from causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Reed et al., 
1990). However RBV research seldom investigates how firms generate causal ambiguity. 
Indeed, causal ambiguity is considered paradoxical in RBV because as it limits resource 
imitation by competitors, it also impedes resource leverage by the firm (King & Zeithaml, 
2001). Through the notion of loose coupling, the sense-making perspective offers what 
appears to be a powerful tool to investigate these issues
2
. 
Weick (1976: 15) sketches out a situation where intention and action appear loosely 
coupled to outsiders, but not to insiders: “if there is an intention A which implies 
selecting actions X and Y, and there is also an intention B which implies selecting actions 
X and Y, then it is possible that under both presence and absence of intention A, action X 
will be selected. Given these circumstances, an observer will falsely conclude that this 
relationship is undeterminant”. However, in such a case, the relationships between A, B, 
C, and D are void of ambiguity to organizational members, but impenetrable to outside 
observers.  
Further, King and Zeithaml (2001) note that competencies may be causally ambiguous 
due to differentiated managerial perceptions across hierarchical levels, and advance this 
situation as a justification of the causal ambiguity paradox. From a sense-making 
perspective, such perceptual differentiations may be expected in loosely-coupled systems 
(Weick, 1979: 168) and even encouraged as an efficient way to effect a cognitive division 
of labor (Nonaka et al., 1995) and operate efficiently a distributed cognitive system 
(Tsoukas, 1996; Weick & Roberts, 1993). This may again make life more difficult for the 
outside observer, but need not be for firm actors: that a capability be poorly understood at 
                                                 
2
: Indeed, the construct of “linkage ambiguity” proposed by King and Zeithaml (2001: 77) appears to be 
synonymous with loose coupling. 
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some level of the organization does not imply that it cannot be leveraged. The notion that 
the top management of the organization should be capable of understanding everything 
that happens at lower levels appears to imply a command-and-control managerial style 
that is not conducive to high performance in contemporary organizations (Grant, 1996b; 
Weick, 1995). The existence of a shared organizational paradigm may provide the 
sufficient coherence to organizational action through tacit knowledge (Baumard, 1999). 
Organizations are not just bundles of resources, they are not just systems of activities 
(Bromiley et al., 2003; Porter, 1996), they are also social contexts where converging 
contributions are assembled and leveraged (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). Loosely coupled 
systems are held together by shared taken-for-granted values (Weick, 1995) and this may 
well be the main reason why social complexity is also a source of causal ambiguity 
(Barney, 1991).  
 
Shared cause maps, paradigms and strategizing 
As noted in the previous paragraph, shared cause maps and organizational paradigms are 
sources of efficiency in managing socially complex organizations and may generate 
causal ambiguity for outside observers. However, the influence of organizational 
paradigms extends beyond this. First of all, shared taken-for-granted values and beliefs 
can operate as a very economical mode of control (Ouchi, 1980), which can be more cost 
efficient than formal mechanisms, and thus potentially a source of competitive advantage. 
However, because these shared values are wholly tacit, they are also difficult to change 
and may be the source of strategic rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or lead to strategic 
drift (Johnson, 1988): culture can be a double-edged sword. 
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Although some RBV research has acknowledged and investigated the influence of 
organizational paradigms on strategic decision-making (e.g.: Collis, 1991: 52), much 
RBV research, perhaps due to an ambiguous engagement with bounded rationality, tends 
to downplay that influence. An important feature of organizational paradigms is how they 
are maintained and influenced by the organization’s dominant coalition (Laroche & 
Nioche, 1998) and with this comes substantial negotiation and political bargaining (Cyert 
et al., 1963; Johnson, 1988). By assuming away the political bargaining activities that 
accompany strategic decision making, RBV researchers may be portraying organizations 
as more actionable than they really are. The sense-making perspective offers arguably a 
richer and more reliable picture, where managerial decision making may be more 
equivocal than assumed in rational models (Laroche, 1995):if the behavioral perspective 
suggests that potentially every employee can be a decision-maker (Simon, 1957), the 
perspective of retrospective sense-making suggest that decisions are not just about 
choices among alternatives, but can also be understood as self-fulfilling prophecies 
(Weick, 1979) or as occasions to make sense of action (Brunsson, 1990). And these 
alternative understandings of decisions do not make them less valuable than the 
traditional view of decision-as-choice: if shared values constitute the glue that holds 
loosely-coupled organizations together, then a judicious utilization of decisions as 
justifications may play a vital role in organizational maintenance. 
 
Structuring organizations and competitive advantage 
Barney (1995) pointed out that the “question of organization” was crucial in establishing 
competitive advantage: “a firm must be organized to exploit its resources and 
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capabilities”. Failing to do so may lead to a disconnect between resources and 
performance (Coff, 1999). However, organizational structures appear to have been 
granted a somewhat ambiguous status within RBV: structures are quasi-resources, 
necessary for the firm to operate, but not sufficient to confer competitive advantage 
(barney, 1995). According to Grant (1996a: 377-378) organizational structures are dual: 
on the one hand are hierarchies of “authority and control”, the traditional formal 
organizational structures that presumably Barney was referring to; and on the other hand 
are “architectures of capabilities”, hierarchies of knowledge integration. These two types 
of structures are independent from each other: “in most companies, hierarchies of 
capabilities do not correspond closely with the authority-based hierarchies as depicted by 
organizational charts”. This duality of structures appears to mirror the distinction between 
fixed resources and the capabilities that used to operate them, a distinction that parallels 
Dierickx and Cool’s (1989: 1506) “bathtub metaphor” opposing stocks and flows. 
This presentation of structures appears non-controversial. Indeed, a similar distinction 
between state descriptions and processes is also used in the sense-making perspective. 
Weick (1979: 46-47) suggests that organizational performance is dependent on the good 
coordination of “blueprints” and “recipes”. However, the exploration of organizational 
structures within RBV empirical research appears to have ignored the 
capability/flow/recipe dimension of structures to concentrate when investigating the 
relationships between types of resources and structural choices. Argyres (1995, 1996) and 
Markides and Williamson (1994) arrive at opposite conclusions in their research. These 
contradictory results suggest that formal structures in themselves may not be sufficient to 
shed enough light on how resources are properly exploited by the organization. The 
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distinction between hierarchy of authority and hierarchy of competence may be a useful 
one, but the sense-making approach suggests that the factors enabling efficient resource 
exploitation are not in the structures themselves, but in how they are articulated one with 
another. Here again, it appears that RBV’s ambivalent attitude towards managerial 
rationality surfaces: ignoring the problem of articulating these two structural dimensions 
is equivalent to assuming that this articulation is unproblematic, or governed by 
substantively rational choices. 
 
In this section, I have outlined how a sense-making perspective can be used to provide 
cognitive foundations to central RBV constructs, suggest improvements to the theory, and 
highlight inconsistencies to be investigated by future research. In the conclusion I discuss 
the implications for management and research. 
 
Conclusion: making sense of the RBV 
A richer theory? 
Reconstructing RBV from a sense-making foundation arguably allows for a richer theory 
and the construction of theoretical representations that are closer to the practicalities of 
managerial action. The sense-making perspective leads to a conceptualization of 
competitive advantage as more fragile and elusive than RBV scholars and managers 
would perhaps wish. Thinking of organizations as social structures maintained and re-
created through interactions directs the spotlight on hitherto under-researched in RBV, 
perhaps due its original roots in economics: people. The complementary notions of 
bounded cognition and incremental action provide behavioral foundations to durable 
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resource heterogeneity, path dependency, and performance differences among firms. The 
concepts of loosely coupled systems and organizational paradigm provide insightful and 
robust underpinnings to uncertain imitability and causal ambiguity. Together, these 
constructs form the theoretical core of RBV (Bromiley, 2005). However, this conceptual 
core has been re-founded without resorting to any of the economics’ assumptions 
traditionally found in RBV research, in particular market equilibrium and optimization. 
This may attract the criticism that the sense-making approach leads to something that has 
little in common with the “original” or “true” RBV. In turn this also leads to question the 
necessity of anchoring strategic management research in economics. 
 
Questioning the economic foundations of RBV? 
The 1991 Strategic Management Journal Winter Special Issue intended to stimulate the 
dialogue between strategic management and economics (Schendel, 1991). And, 
considering the impressive body of strategic management research incorporating 
economics concepts and methodology that has been produced ever since, one can suggest 
that the dialogue has proven to be extremely fruitful and valuable to strategy scholars. 
Indeed, the import of economics concepts and methods into strategic management 
research has been argued to benefit our field in that it brought a unifying paradigm and 
increased rigorousness in research (Foss, 1996). 
However, our discipline, and RBV research in particular, may perhaps be victim of this 
very success. Lockett and Thompson (2001: 724) noted that during the 1990's, RBV had 
experienced a period of 'normal science'. This may well signal a worrying trend. Indeed, 
Lockett and Thompson's assessment of the evolution of RBV research seems to invalidate 
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the anticipation of Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994: 1) that "as an interdisciplinary 
subject, strategic management may never enter an era of 'normal science', but will 
probably always offer shifting perspectives and relatively incommensurable research 
approaches". 
Conceptualizing RBV as a branch of economics, as done by Barney (1991), Conner 
(1991), Peteraf (1993), Liebeskind (1996), and, following their lead, many other 
researchers, is certainly a commendable endeavor, in the sense that results from 
management research might valuably inform future economics research -inasmuch as 
results from economics research, in turn, may yield insights of value to management 
scholars and practitioners. This trading of knowledge should be considered a fruitful basis 
for dialogue and exchange between disciplines. Lockett and Thompson (2001) indeed 
attribute much of the evolution of modern micro-economics' focus, for example the 
heightened attention devoted to such phenomena as path-dependency, to the rise of RBV, 
despite the fact that few strategic management papers are ever quoted by economics 
scholars
3
. 
Unfortunately, Schendel's statement that "economics does not share the same perspective 
with strategic management, nor do they as disciplines share identical interests. If those 
differences are recognized it is possible for the fields to positively see their intersection, 
not as substitutes, but as reinforcing their separate interests" (1991: 3) seems to have been 
long forgotten. Further, Rumelt et al. (1994: 25-39) argued that the conversation of 
                                                 
3
: Lockett and Thompson (2001) note that this may be due economists' reluctance to read journals outside 
their traditional field. In turn, this suggests that if researchers investigating economics conceptualizations of 
RBV have the ambition to influence economics thinking, they should attempt to publish also in economics 
journals. 
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strategic management research should be open to voices from other disciplines, including 
economics, but also organizational sociology, and political science.  
The exploratory conversation between RBV and sense-making engaged in the present 
essay is an attempt to demonstrate the value of a pluralistic attitude to the conversation of 
strategic management. A broad-based exchange of views may lead to challenging 
established notions, and thus avoid the traps of 'normal science'. 
 
RBV as a framework for strategizing? 
Theories can be viewed in at least three ways: 
- As analytical tools that help explain and predict the outcomes of phenomena, and in the 
case of strategic management, organizational success and failure (Rumelt et al., 1994); 
- As interpretive tools that enable us to understand and make sense of an otherwise 
confusing world (Astley, 1985) 
- As tools to act in the world, shape our actions, and strategize (Tsoukas, 1998) 
Adopting a pluralistic epistemological approach to strategic management (Seth & 
Thomas, 1994), these three uses of theory are complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive. 
Weick (1979: 35-37) highlighted that there were trade-offs between accuracy, generality, 
and simplicity in theorizing, and that pursuing two of these qualities was necessarily at 
the expense of the other. I would like to suggest that the same trade-offs may apply to the 
three views of theory and that there are trade-offs in producing theories in terms of 
prediction, understanding, and action. Indeed this seems to be acknowledged by 
Friedman (1953) when he argued that theories could be useful, even if their assumptions 
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were disconnected from practical realities, so long as they provided usable predictions 
and guidance for action. 
To date, RBV has been much criticized for its limited ability to provide any reliable 
predictions (Godfrey et al., 1995; Priem et al., 2001). However, the usefulness of RBV 
appears to be greater in terms of generating understanding and providing a structure for 
strategizing. As Barney (2001b: 49) put it: "resource-based logic can help managers more 
completely understand the kinds of resources that help generate sustained strategic 
advantages, help them use this understanding to evaluate the full range of resources their 
firm may possess, and then exploit those resources that have the potential to generate 
sustained strategic advantage". 
The underlying logic of the sense-making perspective which articulated a presumption of 
logic with a retrospective process of attribution of cause-and-effect may do little to 
improve the predictive quality of RBV, but may help enhance its contribution to 
understanding and strategizing. And this is consistent with the perspective of bounded 
cognition: if at heart RBV is a theory investigating value creation, competitive advantage, 
and rents, it may not have a strong predictive power by its very nature. 
As Schendel eloquently put it: "strategy's audience is the manager and its doctrine 
combines a belief in creativity and innovation with philosophical pragmatism -it is 
concerned with wealth creation, not by an 'actor' in some mathematical model, but reality, 
in a concrete world of people, laws, institutions, beliefs and uncertainty" (1991: 2-3). The 
sense-making approach crucially allows people, beliefs and uncertainty to re-enter the 
scope of RBV theory. 
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RBV certainly has great potential for helping managers and firms to improve their 
practices and performance. The very flexibility of this framework makes it quite 
adaptable to specific firm/industry situations. RBV suggests pointed questions to 
managers ("what are our core competences?", "how can we create more value for 
stakeholders with the resources we have in our current environment(s)?", etc...), and it 
provides a methodology for evaluating resources and competences with respect to 
external demands. Further, the foundation of RBV on sense-making suggests that, 
because competitive advantage is a fragile position, firms should frequently revisit and 
question the beliefs they hold (and have built over time) about their core competences 
and how they can generate value. 
But the realization of this potential may also require that RBV researchers re-examine 
their research practices. 
 
Making RBV Research More Practical 
Aharoni criticized traditional research practices in strategic management in the following 
terms: "business strategy researchers using IO methodology attempt to propose plausible 
generalizations based on carefully designed empirical research or to prove hypotheses 
based on a large population of firms. In doing so, researchers gain mathematical 
elegance, statistical rigor, parsimony and persuasive power. Unfortunately, the price of 
this elegance is ignoring the task of identifying the lessons one can learn from the 
particularly successful or unsuccessful outliers" (1993: 43). 
However, one could argue that there is considerable value in large sample, statistical 
research, in that, for example, it provides reference points against which outlying cases 
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can be analyzed: competitive advantage is a comparative concept, to identify above-
average performance, one needs an average to begin with, and that can only be provided 
for by quantitative research. But quantitative approaches may not be sufficient to provide 
insights useful to understanding and strategizing. 
Qualitative, case-based, methods have been argued to be a useful and necessary 
complement to quantitative methods in RBV research (Godfrey et al., 1995; Hitt, 
Gimeno, & Hoskisson, 1998; Levitas & Chi, 2002; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999, 2002;). 
A sense-making perspective on RBV research confirms that view. Case study research, 
allowing to explore in detail the interplay of resources and competences within firms, 
shedding light on the influence of corporate ideologies, beliefs, routines and how and 
when firm sub-units are loosely- or tightly-coupled, is a source of valuable insights for it 
leads to results that reflect the complexity of organizations (Weick, 1995: 172-173). 
Further, it can be suggested that RBV research, to really achieve its potential and prove 
useful to managers should also further stretch to "action research" (Reason & Bradbury, 
2001) where inquiry is completed by participation. Please note that I do not advocate here 
that RBV scholars should act as management consultants and draw plans telling 
managers what they should do. Rather, the notion of participative inquiry implies that 
scholars should engage a more intimate dialogue with managers about how to apply the 
RBV framework to their specific circumstances, and bring their knowledge and 
understanding to bear when advising managers. "We're trying to make it possible for 
people to have better conversations so that they can see their circumstances more richly" 
(Weick, 1979: 240) could become the motto of RBV scholars -and, by extension, of all 
strategic management researchers. 
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Figure 1: Enactment as retrospective sense-making 
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